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Abstract—In this article, we investigate self-organizing opti-
mization for cognitive small cells (CSCs), which have the ability
to sense the environment, learn from historical information, make
intelligent decisions, and adjust their operational parameters.
By exploring the inherent features, some fundamental challenges
for self-organizing optimization in CSCs are presented and dis-
cussed. Specifically, the dense and random deployment of CSCs
brings about some new challenges in terms of scalability and
adaptation; furthermore, the uncertain, dynamic and incomplete
information constraints also impose some new challenges in terms
of convergence and robustness. For providing better service to
the users and improving the resource utilization, four require-
ments for self-organizing optimization in CSCs are presented
and discussed. Following the attractive fact that the decisions
in game-theoretic models are exactly coincident with those in
self-organizing optimization, i.e., distributed and autonomous,
we establish a framework of game-theoretic solutions for self-
organizing optimization in CSCs, and propose some featured
game models. Specifically, their basic models are presented, some
examples are discussed and future research directions are given.
Index Terms—5G, cognitive small cells, self-organizing opti-
mization, game-theoretic models, distributed learning
I. INTRODUCTION
SMALL cells have been regarded as a promising approachto meet the increasing demand of cellular network capac-
ity. In comparison to macro-cells, low-cost small cells operat-
ing with low-power and short range offer a significant capacity
gain due to spatial reuse of spectrum. Researchers in the
community have realized that enabling cognitive ability into
small cells, which is referred to as cognitive small cells (CSCs)
[1], would further improve the resource utilization. Similar to
cognitive radio, CSCs are able to sense the environment, learn
from historical information, make intelligent decisions, and
adjust their operational parameters.
It is expected that small cells are to be densely deployed
in the near future. Furthermore, small cells may be deployed
by the mobile operators, the enterprises or households, which
means that they would operate in a self-organized, dynamic
and distributed manner. Thus, resource optimization problems
for small cells, e.g., spectrum sharing, carrier selection and
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power control, interference management, and offloading mech-
anism, can not be solved in a centralized manner since it
results in heavy communication overhead and can not adapt to
dynamic environment. As a result, it is important and timely
to develop self-organizing optimization approaches for CSCs.
In this article, by exploring the inherent features of CSCs,
we first discuss and analyze some fundamental challenges
and requirements for self-organizing optimization in CSCs.
Following the attractive advantages of game-theoretic models
for self-organizing optimization, we propose some featured
game-theoretic solutions. It should be pointed out that there
are also some other useful approaches for self-organizing
optimization in distributed wireless networks, e.g., the swarm
intelligence inspired evolutionary algorithms [2]. The reasons
for using game-theoretic solutions are: i) the interactions
among multiple decision-makers can be well modeled and ana-
lyzed, and ii) the outcome of the game is predicable and hence
the system performance can be improved by manipulating the
utility function and the action update rule of each decision-
maker.
Game-theoretic models have been investigated extensively
in wireless communications, and there are some preliminary
game-theoretic solutions for CSCs, e.g., reinforcement learn-
ing with logit equilibrium for power control [3], a hierarchical
dynamic game approach for spectrum sharing and service se-
lection [4], and evolutionary game for self-organized resource
allocation [5]. The presented models in this article mainly
address the inherent features, fundamental requirements and
challenges of CSCs and hence differentiate significantly from
previous ones seen in the literature. In fact, the main objective
of this article is to propose and discuss the featured game-
theoretic models suitable for CSCs.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section II,
the cognition functionality for CSCs is presented. In Section
III, some fundamental challenges and requirements for CSCs
are discussed. In Section IV, some featured game-theoretic
models for self-organizing optimization in CSCs are presented,
and future research directions are given. Finally, we provide
concluding remark in Section IV.
II. COGNITION AND SELF-ORGANIZING OPTIMIZATION
FOR COGNITIVE SMALL CELLS
We first present the cognition functionality for CSCs, which
is the base for self-organizing optimization. The cognition
functionality in cognitive radio is mainly concerned with
acquiring spectrum availability information, i.e., sensing and
identifying spectrum opportunities in time, frequency and
2space domains. To capture the complex environment and
network state, the cognition functionality in CSCs is ex-
tended to explore multi-dimensional information. Such multi-
dimensional information is referred to as contextual informa-
tion, which is used to identify an object of interest.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the target contextual information
includes user type, user demand, access content, user per-
ception, location, energy, network state and spectrum state.
For presentation, we briefly illustrate the above contextual
information. The user type represents the hardware category
i.e., tablet, phone or a laptop. Access content is related
to specific application, e.g., browsing a breaking news or
downloading an APP. User perception is related to the service
quality experienced by the user, while location is where the
small cell is, e.g., indoor or outdoor. Energy is related to
the power for wireless transmission and cooling. Network
state is related to the current network deployment of small
cells and spectrum state is related to the spectrum availability.
Technically, the above contextual information has great impact
on the resource allocation schemes, which will be discussed
later.
As shown in Fig.1, the contextual information in CSCs can
be obtained by the following three methods: sensing, database,
and information exchange among neighbors. i) Sensing: with
the help of cognitive radio technologies, CSCs perform sens-
ing to obtain useful information. For example, the spectrum
occupancy state can be obtained by energy detection or feature
detection (e.g., pilot, modulation type, cyclic prefixes, and
cyclostationarity). Sensing is real-time but consumes resources
including time, energy and bandwidth. ii) Database: database
approach is a powerful tool to provide useful information
for CSCs. For example, spectrum database has recently been
developed to provide spectrum occupancy state for a particular
region, through which the CSCs can inquire the location-
dependent spectrum availability information. Compared with
sensing, database approach is more efficient but is not real-
time. iii) Information exchange among neighbors: since the
CSCs are connected to the core network via cable or optical
fiber, information exchange among CSCs are feasible. How-
ever, it is to be noted that local information exchange between
neighbors is more desirable since global information exchange
leads to heavy communication and signalling overhead.
We argue that the term “cognitive” in CSCs is not limited to
observing the environment and acquiring contextual informa-
tion. Instead, it should include having high-level intelligence.
To achieve such high-level intelligence for CSCs, the most
promising way is to realize knowledge discovery from the con-
textual information. Generally speaking, knowledge is a broad
concept including general principles and natural laws. Taking
the spectrum dynamics as an example, the probability θ that
a particular band is occupied by the macro-cells during 01:00
AM to 04:00 AM is very small, e.g., θ = 0.05, is viewed as
the knowledge in CSCs. Based on the contextual information,
the CSCs can build knowledge base which contains useful
knowledge for self-organizing optimization.
III. CHALLENGES AND REQUIREMENTS FOR
SELF-ORGANIZING OPTIMIZATION IN COGNITIVE SMALL
CELLS
In this section, by exploring the inherent features of CSCs,
we briefly discuss some fundamental challenges and require-
ments for self-organizing optimization in CSCs.
A. Technical challenges
The technical challenges for self-organizing optimization
in CSCs are discussed from the perspectives of network
deployment and information constraints respectively.
First, from the perspective of network deployment of CSCs,
two challenges arise in the following two aspects:
• Scalability. With the increase in the number of small
cells, how would the self-organizing optimization solu-
tions scale up? This is the first basic issue of dense
deployment in CSCs. In addition, since the decisions
of CSCs are interactive, addressing the complicated in-
teractions among the densely deployed CSCs is another
important issue.
• Random deployment. The small cells are deployed by
different entities, e.g., mobile operators, the enterprise or
households. In addition, they may turn to be inactive if
there is no serving client. As a result, the deployment of
small cells is always random and dynamic. Thus, it is
important for the self-organizing optimization solutions
to behave in random and dynamic environment.
Secondly, it is known that information is key to optimization
problems, and the challenges related to information arising in
the CSCs are listed below:
• Uncertain: the observed information may not be the same
with the true information. A well-known example is that
the sensed spectrum states are always imperfect due to
the corruption of noise.
• Dynamic: the observed information is time-varying the
dynamic changes are not determinate. For example, the
network and spectrum states may change from time to
time, and the set of active CSCs may also change from
time to time. Furthermore, the network and spectrum
states in each decision period are random, the set of active
CSCs are random, and their demands are also random.
• Incomplete: due to the constraints in hardware and
resource consumption, each CSC only has partial infor-
mation about the environment; furthermore, it only has
information of its neighboring CSCs (in some extreme
scenarios, it has no information of others). In addition,
a CSC does not know the total number of small cells in
the systems, not to mention the active ones.
Due to the above technical challenges, it is seen that the
task of resource optimization in CSCs is hard to solve even
in a centralized manner, not to mention in a distributed and
self-organizing manner.
B. Requirements for self-organizing optimization
We list some fundamental requirements for self-organizing
optimization in CSCs. Specifically, these requirements are
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Fig. 1. The paradigm of cognition functionality and self-organizing optimization in CSCs.
for user service, network deployment (architecture), and op-
timization methodology. As shown in Fig. 1, based on the
contextual information and knowledge, some self-organizing
optimization approaches can be applied for resource allocation
in CSCs. By employing their inherent features, we discuss
some featured requirements of self-organizing optimization
in CSCs, which mainly include user-centric optimization,
scalability, robustness and heterogeneity.
First, it should shift from throughput-oriented optimization
to user-centric optimization. Traditionally, resource optimiza-
tion schemes in wireless systems are throughput-oriented, with
the objective to maximize throughput/capacity or minimize
delay. However, it is now realized that throughput-oriented
schemes can not provide satisfactory service for the users. In
future mobile communication systems, there is an increasing
trend to develop user-centric optimization schemes rather
than throughput-oriented schemes. The underlying reasons are
twofold: (i) eventually, the purpose of (wireless) communica-
tion is to serve end users. Thus, the contextual information
of the users, e.g., their locations, demands, access contents
and energy, should be taken into account not only in high-
layers but also in PHY and MAC layers for optimization,
(ii) it is realized that mobile (cellular) systems have migrated
towards data and Internet services. In particular, multimedia
service delivery through cellular systems, e.g., watching online
video, is becoming common. For this kind of service, people
may not care about the specific volume of allocated resources,
but sensitively react to the perceived service quality, which is
known as quality of experience (QoE) [6]. It means that user
perception should also be taken into account in self-organizing
optimization.
Secondly, it should admit scalability and address network
density. As stated before, it is expected that the CSCs are
densely deployed with large numbers. A consequence is that
the resource optimization for dense deployment is completely
different than that in sparse environment. Thus, the self-
organized optimization schemes should scale up in densed
CSCs. In addition, density creates congestion and interference
among CSCs, which implies that efficient congestion control
and interference mitigation approaches should be developed.
Thirdly, it should be robust to the dynamic environment.
As discussed before, there are several random and dynamic
factors in CSCs, e.g., the spectrum availability is dynamic, the
CSCs switch between active and inactive randomly. Moreover,
the observed information may be corrupted by noise. Thus,
the self-organizing optimization solutions should be robust to
address the randomness, dynamics, and uncertainty in CSCs.
Last, it should address the hierarchical decision-making in
CSCs. There are always heterogeneous cells with overlapping
coverage in future wireless systems, i.e., macro-cells and small
cells. In such hierarchical networks, the cells in different
layers have different priority and utility functions. That is, it
involves heterogeneous decision-makers. However, traditional
self-organizing optimization solutions are mainly for homoge-
neous decision-makers. Thus, it is important to develop new
hierarchical self-organizing solutions for CSCs.
IV. GAME-THEORETIC SELF-ORGANIZING OPTIMIZATION
FOR COGNITIVE SMALL CELLS
Game theory [7] is an applied mathematic tool to model
and analyze mutual interactions in multiuser decision systems.
Generally, a game model consists of a set of players, a set
of available actions of each player, and a utility function that
maps the action profiles of the all the players into a real value.
There are two major branches of game-theoretic models: non-
cooperative games and cooperative games. From a high-level
perspective of comparison, players in a non-cooperative game
make rational decisions to maximize their individual utility
functions, while players in a cooperative game are grouped
together according to an enforceable agreement for payoff
allocation. In a non-cooperative game, the commonly used
solution concepts are Nash equilibrium (NE) and correlated
equilibrium.
Researchers began to apply game-theoretic models into
wireless communications a decade ago; nowadays, it has been
regarded as a powerful tool for wireless resource allocation
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optimization, e.g., power control, spectrum access, network
selection, spectrum auction and trading, and incentive mecha-
nism design. The decisions of the players in (non-cooperative)
game-theoretic models are distributed and autonomous, which
is an exact coincidence with those in self-organizing optimiza-
tion. Thus, game-theoretic approach is important to achieve
self-organizing optimization in CSCs [8].
A. Framework of game-theoretic self-organizing optimization
To cope with the technical challenges in CSCs, i.e., dense
and dynamic deployment, and uncertain, dynamic and in-
complete information constraints, we propose a framework of
game-theoretic self-optimizing optimization, which is shown
in Fig. 2. It is noted that there are two key steps: i) game
formulation and analysis, and ii) design of multiuser learning
algorithm. In comparison, game formulation and analysis
belongs to theoretical investigation while developing learning
algorithms belongs to the field of algorithm methodology.
On one hand, the stable solutions are the inherent properties
of game-theoretic models, and not relevant to the learning
algorithms. On the other hand, except for the utility function in
game-theoretic models, the uncertain, dynamic and incomplete
information constraints have great impact on the convergence
and performance of learning algorithms. With the two steps
carefully designed, self-organizing optimization for the origi-
nal wireless optimization problems can be achieved.
1) Game formulation and analysis: For game formulation,
one needs to first identify the player and available action set,
and define suitable utility functions for the players. For CSCs,
the player may be a single entity, e.g., small base station
or the user equipment, or a collection of multiple entities,
e.g., a cluster consisting of multiple nearby small cells. The
available action set can be regarded as a combination of
multiple optimization variables. Defining utility function is
key to game formulation since it eventually determines the
properties and performance of the game-theoretic models.
The most efficient game-theoretic model used in wireless
networks is potential game [9], in which there is a potential
function such that the change in the utility function caused
by the unilateral action change of an arbitrary player has
the same trend with that in the potential function, i.e., both
increasing or decreasing. Potential game has at least one pure
strategy NE and all NE points are global or local maxima of
the potential function. Thus, the NE solutions are desirable if
the potential function is related to the original optimization
objective. Furthermore, to ensure that the stable solutions of
game-theoretic models are optimal (near-optimal), an another
efficient method is to define the utility function as the received
payoff minus cost of using the amount of particular resource.
2) Design of multiuser learning algorithms : Identifying
the stable solutions of game-theoretic models is one thing, but
finding them is another different thing. This issue, however,
was underestimated in previous studies. In pure game theory,
players can monitor the environment and other players, which
means that they have perfect information about the actions and
payoffs of other players. As discussed above, this assumption
does not hold in CSCs. With the cognition functionality of
CSCs, players need to observe the results of multiuser interac-
tions, e.g., interference, collision and competition, learn useful
information from the limited feedback, and then adjust their
behaviors towards some desirable solutions. In the context of
game optimization, the objective of multiuser learning is to
converge to a stable solution with good performance.
Denote an(k) as the action of player n in the kth iteration,
and a−n(k) as the action profile of all other players except n.
Due to the interactions (interference, congestion or competi-
tion) among players, the received payoff rn(k) of each player
is jointly determined by the action profile of all players, and it
may be deterministic or random. Generally, the players update
their actions based on the current action-payoff information{
an(k), a−n(k); rn(k), r−n(k)
}
. Thus, the system evolution
can be described as {an(k), a−n(k)} → {rn(k), r−n(k)} →
{an(k + 1), a−n(k + 1)}, and the objective is to converge to
a stable action profile that maximizes the system utility.
The uncertain, dynamic and incomplete information con-
straints in CSCs may pose some new challenges. Specifically,
i) a player does not know the information about all other
players, i.e., a−n(k) and r−n(k) are unknown, ii) the received
payoff rn(k) may be random and time-varying. Thus, the up-
date rule needs to be carefully designed to guarantee the con-
vergence towards desirable solutions. When local information
among neighboring players is available, it is desirable to de-
velop partially uncoupled learning algorithms based on the par-
tial action-payoff information
{
an(k), aJn(k); rn(k), rJn(k)
}
,
where aJn(k) and rJn(k) are the action-payoff information of
the neighboring players. In some extreme scenarios with no
information exchange available, one needs to develop fully
uncoupled learning algorithms based on the individual action-
payoff information
{
an(k), rn(k)
}
. There are some useful
partially coupled learning algorithms, e.g., local altruistic
behavior with spatial adaptive play [10], and fully uncoupled
learning algorithms, e.g., stochastic learning automata [11],
that can be applied for self-organizing optimization in CSCs.
B. Some featured game-theoretic models for CSCs
In methodology, previous game-theoretic models in wireless
communications can be applied to CSCs. However, most
previous game-theoretic solutions mainly focused on analyzing
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the properties of game-theoretic models in ideal scenarios, and
did not take into account the challenges and requirements in
CSCs. In this subsection, we propose some featured game
modes for CSCs. Due to the low-power, the transmission of
a small cell only affects its neighbors; as a result, graphical
games [10] are appropriate for small cell networks.
1) Demand-aware game: Most existing resource optimiza-
tion approaches mainly focused on maximizing the resource
utilization, while ignoring the actual demand of the users.
In future CSCs, demand-aware design and decision is more
desirable. To include the user demand into the resource op-
timization problems, a useful method is to map the allocated
resource to the user satisfaction utility. Specifically, denote
user n’s demand as dn and the allocated resource as rn, then
its satisfaction utility can be expressed as sn(rn, dn).
Generally, there are two kinds of satisfaction functions in
the literature: i) the linear satisfaction: the satisfactory utility
is determined by rn
dn
if rn ≤ dn, and is equal to one otherwise,
and ii) the sigmoid satisfaction: the satisfactory utility function
is generally determined by 1
1+e−c(rn−dn)
, where c is used to
adjust the slope of the satisfaction utility curve around the
user demand dn with different types of traffic. In particular,
real-time traffic such as online video are sensitive to acquired
resources and require strict performance requirements, which
corresponds to large value of c, while non-real-time traffic
such as E-mail or file transfer are less sensitive, which
corresponds to small value of c. The linear and sigmoid
satisfaction functions have been well investigated in previous
game-theoretic wireless resource optimization problems. As
the satisfaction utility function is strictly increasing, each user
proceeds to compete for wireless resource even if the obtained
resource is larger than the demand, which would decrease
the satisfaction of others. However, this drawback has not
addressed in previous work.
To improve the network satisfaction, an efficient approach
is to prevent the users compete for extra resources when it
is satisfied and to decrease the satisfaction utility when it
occupies additional resources. Based on this intuition, the con-
cave satisfaction utilities may be more suitable for multiuser
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communication networks. An example of concave satisfaction
utilities is given by
(
2
√
rndn
dn+rn
)α
, where α is used to adjust
the slope of the utility curve for different types of traffic. For
illustration, we consider the problem of distributed spectrum
access for CSCs. Specifically, the CSCs are randomly located
in a region of 100m × 100m, and the sensing-based spectrum
access protocol proposed in [1] was applied. The problem
of distributed spectrum access is formulated as a graphical
game and the learning automata [11] is applied. Different
typical applications, such as G.711PCM, WMV, AVI/RM,
Flash, H.264, are considered in the simulation. The compar-
ison results are presented in Fig. 3. It is noted that with the
proposed satisfaction function, the satisfaction user ratio is
largely improved. In particular, as the network scales up, the
throughput gain becomes significant.
2) Discrete-QoE-aware game: Eventually, the purpose of
wireless communications is to serve people. Thus, the per-
ception by people, i.e., QoE, should be included in the game
formulation. Unlike the satisfaction function which is charac-
terized by continuous and real values, the perception of people
is generally subjective and discrete. For example, a person
may feel “Excellent”, “Good”, “Fair”, “Poor” and “Bad”,
by the method of the mean opinion score [6]. Compared
with traditional continuous optimization game, an interesting
result of discrete-QoE-aware game is the expansion of Nash
equilibrium, which is shown and illustrated in Fig. 4.
In traditional continuous optimization game, users maximize
their throughput as there is an inherent principle: larger
throughput is always better. On the contrary, a user in discrete-
QoE-aware games does not always maximize its throughput
unless its QoE level can be improved, e.g., from “Poor” to
“Fair”. Thus, it can be expected that the discrete-QoE-aware
game would improve the network QoE.
To further show the benefit of discrete-QoE-aware game, we
consider the problem of distributed user association in LTE-A
small cell networks. For users located in the overlapping areas,
there are multiple small cell access points (SAPs) available
and the users need to choose one to associate. Consider
three types of video calling users using Skype: i) the first
one is the group video calling with the required minimal
throughput Rm = 512kbps and the recommended throughput
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Rc = 2Mbps, ii) the second one is the high definition video
calling with Rm = 1.2Mbps and Rc = 1.5Mbps, and iii)
the third one is the general video calling user with the with
Rm = 128kbps and Rc = 500kbps. Each user falls into
one of the above three types with equal probabilities. It is
believed that the minimal throughput only supports the basic
user demand (“Poor”), while the recommended throughput
offer sufficiently good user experience (“Good”). With the
method proposed in [12], the throughput thresholds for other
QoE levels (“Excellent”, “Fair” and “Bad”) can be obtained
accordingly.
Considering a network with 78 users which can access only
one SAP, and 20 users which are located in the overlapping
regions of neighboring CSCs, the comparison results of the
number of users in different QoE levels are shown in Fig. 5.
It is seen that the discrete-QoE-aware game outperforms the
continuous optimization game. Specifically, with the discrete-
QoE-aware game, 12 users are in “Excellent”, one in “Good”,
two in “Fair”, and five in “Bad”; with the continuous opti-
mization game, 11 users are in “Excellent”, none in “Good”,
three in “Fair” and five in “Bad”. Also, it is noted that
the throughput maximization approach (the user demand is
neglected) achieves poor network QoE. This result validates
the superiority of the discrete-QoE-aware game.
3) Hierarchical game: As stated before, CSCs would in-
teract with macro-cells for dynamic spectrum sharing and
mobile offloading. While originally studied in the economic
context of duopolies in which one company has the power
to act before the other companies, Stackelberg game, which
is an important kind of hierarchical games, is suitable for
systems that contain a natural hierarchy. Therefore, to address
the hierarchical decision-making between macro-cells (always
acting as a leader) and CSCs (always acting as followers),
Stackelberg game is becoming a useful tool [4].
In addition, following the idea of “divide-and-conquer”,
hierarchical game can also be used to address the dense de-
ployment of CSCs. In particular, in order to ease the challenges
caused by the large number of participants, we can create
hierarchy to transform the large-scale optimization problem
into several layers of sequential sub-problems. To achieve
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this, a useful method is clustering. An example of creating
hierarchy to use cluster-based hierarchical game in large-scale
CSCs is shown in Fig. 6. In (a), the network topology and the
interference relationship is presented. In (b), the neighboring
small cells distributively form two disjoint clusters with cells
3 and cell serving as the headers respectively. In (c), in the
upper layer, the headers compete for resources with each other,
aiming to maximize the aggregate utility of the cluster; in the
lower layer, the cluster members compete with other members,
under the policies imposed by the header. In (d), since differ-
ent clusters behave independently, there may be interference
between neighboring clusters, e.g., cells 4 and 5 still interfere
with each other. Thus, the interfering cells further mitigate
mutual interference via distributed learning, e.g., Q-learning.
With the proposed cluster-based hierarchical structure, the self-
organizing optimization in large-scale networks can then be
solved with moderate computational complexity.
We compare the computational complexity between the
proposed cluster-based hierarchical game and the simultaneous
Q-learning approach [13], in which all cells performs Q-
learning simultaneously. The achievable network throughput
of two approaches is almost the same. The cumulative dis-
tribution function (CDF) of the iterations needed to converge
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Fig. 8. The expected Shannon capacity when varying the active probabilities
of the cells.
is shown in Fig. 7. It is noted from the figure that for the
same size network, e.g., N = 50 or N = 80, the iterations
needed for converging of the hierarchical-game Q-learning
approach are significantly decreased. Furthermore, when the
network scales up from N = 50 to N = 80, the convergence
speed of the hierarchical-game based Q-learning approach
slightly decreased while that of the simultaneous Q-learning
approach is largely decreased. This implies that the proposed
hierarchical-game based approach is especially suitable for
dense and large-scale networks.
4) Robust game: To capture the random and dynamic behav-
iors in CSCs, robust game is a good candidate. Specifically, the
utility function in robust games is defined over statistics [14],
e.g., expectation or other high-order statistics. In the following,
we present a robust spectrum access game for CSCs as an
illustrative example.
Consider a distributed CSC network operating in the TV
white space. Each cognitive SAP inquires the spectrum avail-
ability from the geo-location database, which specifies the
available channel set and the maximum allowable transmission
power for each cell. To capture the dynamic cell load in
practical applications, we consider a network with a varying
number of active cells. Specifically, it is assumed that each cell
performs spectrum access with probability λn, 0 < λn ≤ 1, in
each decision period. Note that such a model captures general
kinds of dynamics in wireless networks, e.g., a cell becomes
active only when it has data to transmit and inactive when
there is no transmission demand. Also, it can be regarded
as an abstraction of the dynamic cell loading, i.e., the cell
active probability corresponds to the probability of a non-
empty loading buffer. Note that the active cell set in each
period is not deterministic and randomly changes from period
to period. Also, a cell does not know the active probabilities
of other cells.
To address the dynamic and random deployment of CSCs, a
robust spectrum access game can be formulated, in which the
utility function of a CSC is defined as the expected Shannon
capacity over all possible active cell sets. The game can be
proved to be a potential game [9] and hence the distributed
learning automata algorithm [11] can be applied to converge to
NE points in the dynamic environment. Taking a network with
nine CSCs as an illustrative example, the throughput perfor-
mance comparison results are shown in Fig. 8. The optimum
is obtained using the exhaustive search method in a centralized
manner, by assuming that there is a genie that knows all
required information. The best and worst NE is obtained
using the best response algorithm in a distributed manner, by
assuming that information exchange among neighboring cells
is available. Some important results can be observed: i) the
best NE is almost the same with the optimal one, while the
throughput gap between the worse NE and the optimum is
also trivial, which validates the effectiveness of the formulated
robust spectrum game, ii) the achievable throughput of the
distributed learning automata is very close to the optimal one.
5) Content-aware game: As legacy cellular systems have
migrated towards data and Internet services, taking into ac-
count the access content in the self-organizing optimization
would enjoy content gain. For Internet traffic, it has been
shown in [15] that a relatively small proportion of the access
items accounts for a vast fraction of the information accesses,
and the Zipf’s law can be used to determine the occurrence fre-
quency of the access items, given the content rank, the content
pool size, and the characteristic curve of the access pattern.
Nowadays, content caching has become a core technology for
wireless cellular systems. Thus, it is reasonable to replicate
significant portions of popular contents on the wireless caches.
As a result, the search and access time for popular content is
fast compared with that of unpopular content. The reason is
that the popular content can be accessed in the wireless caches,
while the unpopular content is accessed in the far-side server.
Therefore, the differences in access time of different contents
will have great impact on wireless resource allocation and it
is promising to explore content-aware game-theoretic solutions
for CSCs, which would achieve better performance.
C. Comparative summarization and analysis
In comparison, the game-theoretic models for CSCs pre-
sented in this article different from previous ones significantly.
Specifically, it shifts from throughput-oriented optimization to
user-centric optimization, e.g., demand-aware game, discrete-
QoE-aware game and content-aware game, addresses the dense
deployment of small cells, e.g., graphical game and hierarchi-
cal game, and copes with randomness and dynamics well, e.g.,
robust game. Although the research on game-theoretic self-
organizing optimization for CSCs is in infancy, we believe that
the presented game-theoretic models will draw great attention
in the near future.
For a specific resource optimization problem in CSCs, one
can choose a suitable game-theoretic model and a learning
algorithm to construct a self-organizing optimization solution.
However, it should be pointed out that game-theoretic so-
lution for CSCs is application-dependent, which means that
the game-theoretic model and distributed learning algorithm
should be carefully formulated and designed.
8D. Future research direction
It is seen that game-theoretic solutions for self-organizing
optimization in CSCs have definitely drawn a beautiful and ex-
citing future, though the current research is still far away from
the expected vision. We list some future research problems for
game-theoretic models and learning procedures below:
1) Develop or investigate new game-theoretic models for
self-organizing optimization from social/biological be-
haviors. The rationale behind is that in old days hu-
manity first self-organized and then evolved success-
fully with population growth. For example, motivated
by the local altruistic behavior in biological systems,
a local altruistic game with each player maximizing
its utility and the aggregate utilities of its neighbors
was proposed to achieve global optimization via local
information exchange [10]. The key design of this issue
is to properly abstract and model the social/biological
behaviors, which is interesting and challenging.
2) It is noted that each kind of presented game mainly
addresses a single aspect of challenges in CSCs. How-
ever, as can be expected, one may combine more than
one game-theoretic model, e.g., robust discrete-QoE-
aware game or Stackelberg graphical game, to address
multiple aspects of challenges of CSCs simultaneously.
Such combinations bring about new challenges since the
game structure is completely changed.
3) Design and analyze heterogeneous learning algorithms.
In most existing studies, it is assumed that all the
decision-makers employed the same learning algorithm.
However, this assumption is for academic research but
not true in practical systems. In practice, the small
cells may belong to different holders, which may adopt
different learning algorithms; in addition, even the small
cells belonging to the same holder may have different
processing ability and preference, and hence choose
heterogeneous learning algorithms. Introducing hetero-
geneity into the learning procedure will change the
convergence and asymptotic behavior, which needs to
be further studied.
4) Design knowledge-assisted learning algorithms. The
common procedure in existing learning algorithms is
to update the strategies based on the historical action-
payoff information. It may take long time to converge
to stable solutions since the players need to explore all
the possible actions. As shown in Fig. 1, knowledge
can be viewed as high-level intelligence obtained from
the contextual information, which is truly beneficial for
decision-making. Thus, we should develop some new
knowledge-assisted learning technologies to increase the
converging speed and achieve better performance.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, we investigated self-organizing optimization
for CSCs, which will play an important role in future cognitive
cellular systems. By exploring the inherent features, some
fundamental challenges and requirements for self-organizing
optimization in CSCs were presented and discussed. Follow-
ing the attractive advantages of game-theoretic models, i.e.,
distributed and autonomous decision-making, a framework
of game-theoretic solutions for self-organizing optimization
in CSCs was established, and some featured game-theoretic
models were proposed. Specifically, the basic game-theoretic
models are presented, some insights are discussed, some
examples are discussed and future research directions are
given.
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